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Henry Clay and Lajos Kossuth’s Visit in the United 
States, 1851–18521 
Csaba Lévai 
The visit of Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894) in the United States is one 
of the best-known chapters in the history of Hungarian-American 
relations. It has often been seen in the Hungarian literature as a 
triumphant journey when the great Hungarian patriot charmed the 
American public and convinced it to support the cause of the freedom of 
Hungary (Pivány, 1944, 13–14). On the other hand, some segments of 
American society and politics vehemently opposed the measure of 
European intervention proposed by Kossuth. Such influential American 
intellectuals took the floor and denounced the ideas of the former 
governor of Hungary as William Lloyd Garrison (1805–1879), Frederick 
Douglass (1818–1895), and Orestes Brownson (1803–1876) (Várdy, 
2000, 53–54; Várdy 2002, 27–29; Jánossy, 1940, 167–168). This 
powerful opposition played a crucial role in Kossuth’s failure in the 
United States.  
Much has been written about the causes of Kossuth’s fiasco and 
about the roots of it in American domestic politics. Among others Steven 
Béla Várdy, Timothy M. Roberts, Daniel W. Howe and myself called the 
attention to the different factors behind the refusal of contemporary 
American politicians, including the debate about slavery, the political, 
and economic interests of the United States, and the tactical mistakes 
made by Kossuth himself (Várdy, 1998, 337–339; Várdy, 2000, 51–55;. 
Várdy, 2002, 21–31; Howe-Roberts, 166–167, 172–173; Lévai, 317–320; 
Vida, 2012, 9–13) The authors, who covered the topic, often pointed out 
the role contemporary American political leaders played in these events. 
Ödön Vasváry described the refusal of Kossuth by President Millard 
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Fillmore (1800–1874), and several historians gave account of the political 
motifs of secretary of state Daniel Webster (1782–1852) (Vasváry, 1988, 
81–82; Várdy, 1998, 334, 337; Várdy, 2000, 52; Várdy, 2002, 22; Lévai, 
309–320). It is mentioned by some experts that yet another leading figure 
of American politics opposed vehemently the ideas of Kossuth 
concerning the intervention of the United States in European affairs on 
behalf the Hungarian independence (Howe-Roberts, 173; Nolan, 363; 
Lévai, 319; Oliver, 492–493, 495). This person was senator, former 
secretary of state, and three times presidential candidate Henry Clay 
(1777–1852) who had been one of the most prestigious politicians in the 
United States by the 1850s. Born only one year after the declaration of 
American independence, the seventy-four year old Henry Clay was the 
grand old man of contemporary American politics, thus he was very 
influential and respected. He was one of the important leaders of the 
governing Whig party which meant that his opinion could influence the 
formation of the opinion of Whig leadership about Kossuth and his visit 
in the United States. This role of his is usually ignored by historians of 
Hungarian origin. Dénes Jánossy was the only Hungarian historian who 
discussed the opinion of Henry Clay in a somewhat detailed manner, but 
even he referred to it only sporadically in his two-volume collection about 
the history of the Kossuth emigration in England and the United States, 
and did not summarize it. Understandably, American historians devoted 
much attention to the opinion of Henry Clay concerning Kossuth and the 
“Hungarian question”, but they usually studied it exclusively from the 
point of view of American domestic politics. In this essay I intend to 
combine the approach of Hungarian and American historians and analyze 
the intermingled questions of the aims of Kossuth and American domestic 
politics as a coherent problem. American politics had been preoccupied 
by two issues at the beginning of the 1850s: the “Hungarian question”, 
that is the reaction of the United States to the defeat of the European and 
Hungarian revolutions in 1848–1849, and the problem of the territorial 
expansion of slavery. These two issues had been interconnected not only 
in politics but also in the mind of Henry Clay. My goal in this essay is to 
answer the question, why Henry Clay opposed so vigorously Kossuth’s 
ideas about European intervention. With the above mentioned in mind 
one can answer this question only if he or she studies both issues as a 
coherent problem in the mind of the Kentuckian politician. In order to 
answer this question, first we need to summarize briefly the political 
career and ideas of the “grand old man” of contemporary American 
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politics. Then, I am going to discuss the impact of the “Hungarian 
question” on the thinking of Henry Clay, followed by looking at his 
opinion about the territorial extension of slavery. Finally, at the end of my 
treatise, I will try to explain how the interconnected issues of the 
Hungarian revolution and slavery determined the ideas of Clay 
concerning Lajos Kossuth. 
The political career of Henry Clay prior to 1848 
Henry Clay was born on April 12, 1777 in Hanover County during 
the revolutionary war in the contemporary frontier region of Virginia. He 
studied law and he moved to Kentucky at the end of the 18
th
 century, 
where he established a very successful legal practice. His growing 
reputation urged him to start a political career. He was elected to the state 
legislature in 1803 where he continued until 1806 when he was elected to 
the United States Senate. (1757–1840). During his long political career he 
served in the Senate in 1806–1807, 1810–1811, 1831–1842, and 1849–
1852, and he was the member of the United States House of 
Representatives in 1811–1814, 1815–1821, and 1823–1825. He was a 
three times presidential candidate (1824, 1832, 1844), and also served as 
the secretary of state of President John Quincy Adams between 1825 and 
1829. Here and now I do not want to describe his career in details, but I 
focus only on those parts of his life which are important for the purpose 
of this essay. It means that I emphasize his efforts as the “Great 
Compromiser” to find a peaceful solution to the problem of the territorial 
expansion of slavery 
Henry Clay played a crucial role in the formation of the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820. The debate about the admission of Missouri into 
the Union was the first occasion when the problem of the extension of 
slavery became the crucial question of national politics. The territory of 
Missouri was the part of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. Since the 
territory was populated mainly by Southerners, the proposed state 
constitution of Missouri recognized slavery. By the year of 1820 the 
North had outstripped the South in population, and consequently could 
gain control of the United States House of Representatives. During the 
debate of the Missouri constitution a representative from New York 
proposed an amendment “requiring the gradual abolition of slavery as a 
condition of admission” (Jones, 112). Due to the above-mentioned 
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balance of forces the House passed the amendment but it was defeated in 
the Senate. There were eleven slave states and eleven free states in the 
Union at that time and, as Maldwyn A. Jones points out: “Which section 
would control the federal government in the future depended on whether 
slavery was to be permitted in Missouri and the rest of the Louisiana 
Purchase” (Jones, 112). Henry Clay was the main architect of the 
compromise that could temporarily settle the question. Missouri was 
admitted as a slave state but in exchange for that Maine, hitherto part of 
Massachusetts, became a free state. Slavery was forbidden on the territory 
of the Louisiana Purchase north of the line 36°30’ except for Missouri. 
But Missouri started to exclude free blacks from its territory in 1821 and 
Clay had to intervene again to devise another compromise. During the 
debate about slavery in Missouri Henry Clay was motivated mainly by his 
anxiety about the extension of the power of Congress over the states. This 
was the first occasion when he played the role of the designer of a 
political compromise between the supporters of the extension of slavery 
into the territories and the oppositional party. 
The second occasion came at the beginning of the 1830s during the 
so-called “Nullification Crises.” In order to support the development of 
industry in the United States Henry Clay was the advocate of high 
protective tariffs. He played a crucial role in the introduction of high 
tariffs in 1828. High tariffs were not in the interest of the planters of the 
South. The reduction of duties by the tariff bill of 1832 did not satisfy the 
planter elite of South Carolina and a popularly elected convention of the 
state pronounced the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832 unconstitutional as well 
as null and void. The convention also prohibited the collection of federal 
customs duties in South Carolina after February 1, 1833. President 
Jackson “asked Congress for a ‘force bill’ empowering him to use the 
armed forces to collect customs duties in South Carolina.” (Jones, 144) 
The result was the so-called “nullification crisis” in which Henry Clay 
played again the role of the compromiser. He wanted to avoid the 
outbreak of a civil war at all cost, and behind the scenes he made an 
agreement with the leading South Carolina politician John C. Calhoun 
(1782–1850). Clay proposed “a compromise measure providing for the 
gradual reduction of all tariffs over a nine-year period to a uniform level 
of 20 percent.” (Jones, 144) Congress passed the bill on March 1, 1833 
and the South Carolina convention also accepted it two weeks later. 
By the end of the 1840s Henry Clay became one of the most 
influential American politicians, and American politics had to face two 
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important issues at that time: the impact of the European revolutions of 
1848–1848 on the United States, and the territorial extension of slavery. 
These are the two interconnected factors that fundamentally determined 
the opinion of Henry Clay about Kossuth.  
Henry Clay and the impact of the Hungarian revolution of 1848–1849 
on the United States 
As Daniel W. Howe and Timothy Roberts pointed out:  
The United States had a paradoxical relationship to the revolutions of 
1848. On the one hand, the nation had been born out of a revolution, and 
Americans were extremely proud of this revolutionary heritage. It 
disposed them to welcome the European revolutions in 1848, and wish 
them success. On the other hand, however, most Americans also felt 
somewhat detached from the events they read about. (Howe-Robertson, 
158) 
The two historians enumerated several sources of this detachment. 
The European revolutions, especially in central and southern Europe 
“reflected the national aspirations of ethnic groups. American citizenship, 
however, was defined in terms of republican ideology, not in terms of 
national origins.” (Howe-Roberts, 158; Vajda; Lévai 2003) Howe and 
Roberts also called the attention to the fact that many American Catholics 
expressed their anxiety because of the European revolutions threatening 
the rule and the influence of the Pope. The political instability in Europe 
was not in the interest of some American business groups either. They 
wanted the return of business confidence and applauded the triumph of 
authoritarian regimes. (Howe-Robertson, 172–173) The European 
revolutions of 1848 resulted in the emancipation of slaves in the French 
and Danish West Indies, and the abolition of serfdom in a few European 
countries. Some Southern politicians regarded these developments as 
potentially dangerous examples. On the other hand, in another article, 
Timothy M. Roberts called the attention to the very interesting fact that 
many Southern intellectuals, similarly to their Northern colleagues, 
supported the Hungarian cause. Some Southern editors could find 
parallels between the position of Hungary and the South. According to an 
editorial of the Southern Literary Messenger “the [Hungarians are] fully 
aware of their dangerous position … hated by the Slaves (viz. the Slavs), 
isolated among the nations of the earth, they were left alone … to resist 
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the conspiracy against them.” As Timothy M. Roberts noted although the 
spelling of the word “Slav” as “Slave” was “consistent with other 
American periodicals’ grammar of the day … with its tone and contextual 
language the southern journal’s sympathy for the Hungarians’ plight 
sounded like a bleak southern self-assessment.” (Roberts, 271) Contrary 
to this favorable evaluation of the Hungarian cause, Southern journalists 
usually condemned the French revolution of 1848. According to Roberts 
the cause of this different evaluation was that:  
Hungarians were not promoting socialist utopias, nor did they maintain 
West Indies plantations, where slave emancipation was looming. 
Moreover, unlike France, Hungary did not appear to be trying to extend 
its revolution to areas near or within American borders. Southerners 
shared northerners’ revulsion over France’s pathological revolutionary 
past. Hungary, in contrast, had no preexisting revolutionary identity gone 
sour. (Roberts, 273) 
The opinion of Henry Clay about the European and Hungarian 
revolutions of 1848–1849 was also very complex. On the one hand, he 
applauded the efforts of European liberals to establish republican 
governments in the Old World. As Calvin Colton, the editor of his works, 
pointed out, “he sympathized with Hungary profoundly; he loved the 
patriot martyr (viz. Kossuth) who was about to come into his presence.” 
(Colton, 221) On the other hand, he rejected vehemently the idea of 
intervention raised by some American politicians and Kossuth himself. 
As it is well known, President Zachary Taylor, who supported the 
expansion of the United States, sent Ambrose Dudley Mann (1801–1889) 
as an American emissary to Hungary in the summer of 1849. Although 
Mann arrived in Vienna on July 30, and he did not continue his travel to 
Hungary or approve of her independence, his mission provoked 
significant diplomatic tension between the United States and the Austrian 
Empire. Much has been written about this affair, and the role Chevalier 
Johann Georg Hülsemann, the Austrian envoy in Washington, and 
secretary of state Daniel Webster played in it. (Pivány, 1910; Várdy, 
2000, 46–48; Lévai, 2005, 302–320; Howe-Robertson, 170) My focus is 
on the opinion of Henry Clay about Kossuth and the Hungarian revolution 
in this essay, consequently I do not wish to go into the details. The text of 
the instructions of Mann, the fact that secretary of state John M. Clayton 
(1796–1856) publicized the mission of him in the New York Tribune, and 
some passages of the state of the union address of President Taylor in 
December 1849, forced Hülsemann to lodge an official complaint. 
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Somewhat later, Senator Lewis Cass (1782–1866), who was the 
presidential candidate of the Democratic Party at the last election in 1848, 
submitted a resolution to instruct the Committee of Foreign Relations of 
the Senate to suspend diplomatic relations with Austria. Cass clearly 
counted on the support of the Whig Henry Clay, but to his surprise the 
Kentuckian rejected his overture in a long speech he delivered in the 
Senate. As Clay pointed out in this address, Cass’ proposal would involve 
the recall of the American envoy from Vienna, and he feared that “the 
natural conclusion would be to declare war immediately against Austria.” 
(Hay, 643) Instead of the suspension of diplomatic relations, Clay 
proposed Cass to offer asylum for the Hungarian refugees. Clay reminded 
his colleague that the recall of the American chargé d’ affaires would only 
“close the door of intercourse with Austria, by which we shall gain 
nothing in behalf of the suffering Hungarians.” (Hay, 644) In addition, 
such measure would “deprive our merchants and the sailors of our 
country of what benefits might redound from having a minister in 
Vienna.” (Hay, 644) Cass referred to the fact that Henry Clay supported 
the recognition of the Latin American republics at the beginning of the 
1820s. Clay refused the idea that his behavior might have served as an 
analogy in the case of Hungary, since, in contrast to the republics of 
South America more than twenty years ago, “unfortunately, Hungary fell 
suddenly, and to the surprise of the American world. She is subdued; she 
is crushed.” (Hay, 644) The Kentuckian unequivocally rejected the idea of 
intervention supported by Cass. He asked his colleague from Michigan to 
lay down the limits of intervention into the affairs of other nations: “We 
may say in reference to Turkey, Your religion tolerates polygamy; unless 
you change your religion, and your habits of social life, we will cease all 
intercourse with you.” (Hay, 644) In the opinion of Clay the United States 
should condemn Russia’s interference in the war, and he did not 
understand why Cass proposed the suspension of diplomatic relations 
with Austria instead of Russia. Since Hungary was the part of the 
Habsburg Empire Cass’ proposal would call the United States “to 
interfere between Austria and a portion of her empire; and we are called 
upon to do this, in direct contradiction to the whole policy of this 
Government, first laid down by Washington and pursued by every 
successor he has had.” (Hay, 644) Close to the end of his address Clay 
posed again the theoretical question: “Sir, if we are to become the 
defender of nations, the censurers of other Powers, I again ask the 
honorable Senator where are we to stop, and why does he confine himself 
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to Austria alone?” (Hay, 644) Finally, referring to the United States, Clay 
concluded that “this is a great country… that very greatness draws after it 
great responsibilities… to avoid unnecessary wars, maintaining our own 
rights with firmness, but invading the rights of no others.” (Hay, 645) 
It is clear from this speech that Clay had refused the idea of 
intervention almost two years before the arrival of Lajos Kossuth in the 
United States. It means that he did not simply rebuff the person and the 
principles of Kossuth, but he opposed intervention on theoretical grounds 
and for other reasons, too. In order to understand the motivations of 
Henry Clay we should throw a glance at contemporary American politics. 
Territorial expansion, and in connection with this, slavery became the 
central issues of American domestic politics by the 1840s. The annexation 
of Texas and then the war against Mexico (1846–1848) preoccupied 
American politicians. As a result of the victory against Mexico, the 
United States gained an enormously large section, including the territories 
of present day California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico and 
Texas. It means that the United States did not reject the idea of 
intervention into the affairs of other countries on the continent of North 
America, if it coincided with her putative national interests. As mentioned 
before, Henry Clay originally opposed the war against Mexico, since he 
thought that it would raise the dangerous question of the territorial 
expansion of slavery. Expansion was supported mainly by the states of 
the Midwest and the Democratic Party. Under such circumstances a new 
group emerged within the Democratic Party by the middle of the 1840s. 
This group was called the “Young America” and it not only propagated 
the territorial expansion of the United States, but also urged the American 
government to support liberal republican political movements abroad. 
They thought that it was the obligation of the American republic to 
disseminate republican government all over the world. The name of the 
group clearly referred to such European revolutionary movements as 
“Young Italy, Germany or Ireland”. Most of the leaders of “Young 
America” were young politicians and came from the Midwest. One of the 
most active leaders of the group was George N. Sanders from Kentucky, 
Henry Clay’s home state.  
Merle Curti called the attention to an old enmity between Sanders 
and Clay going back to the middle of the 1840s. (Curti, 38) Henry Clay 
was the presidential candidate of the Whig Party in 1844 and it seemed to 
everybody that Martin Van Buren would be that of the Democratic Party. 
The central issue of contemporary politics was the admission of Oregon 
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and Texas into the Union, and the annexation of the latter also raising the 
problem of the territorial extension of slavery. Both hopeful candidates 
thought that this problematic question would divide the nation and would 
possibly lead to a war with Mexico. Clay and Van Buren respectively 
issued statements in which they declared “that annexation was 
inexpedient because it would be likely to bring war with Mexico.” (Jones, 
180) Clay was officially nominated by the Whig Party on a platform 
which was silent about the question of Texas. On the other hand, partly 
due to his statement concerning the annexation of Texas, Van Buren 
could not secure for himself the Democratic nomination against James K. 
Polk (1795–1849), who was a well-known expansionist. The Democratic 
platform included the reoccupation of Oregon and the re-annexation of 
Texas and public opinion was clearly in favor of territorial expansion. 
George N. Sanders had been the main supporter of the annexation of 
Texas in Kentucky, and thus, his agitation had played a major role in 
forcing Henry Clay to give up his original intent, and to expose his ideas 
concerning the annexation of Texas. Clay issued a declaration in which he 
stated that the problem of slavery was not involved in the question of 
Texas. He halfheartedly supported the annexation of Texas on the 
understanding that it could be done “without dishonor, without war, with 
the common consent of the Union, and upon just and fair terms.” 
(Malone, 178) According to Maldwyn A. Jones, Clay’s declaration “may 
have done him some good in the South but on balance it was a mistake for 
it lost him support in the North, especially in the key state of New York. 
Had Clay carried it, he would have been President, but Whig antislavery 
voters deserted to the Liberty Party in sufficient numbers to throw the 
state to Polk.” (Jones, 181) No doubt, that Henry Clay had the largest 
chance to win the presidency at this occasion. The race was very close 
and the Democratic victory was extremely narrow. Voter participation 
was over 78 percent. Polk received 1,338,464 popular and 170 electoral 
votes, while 1,300,097 constituents voted for Clay, who received 105 
electoral votes. (Chudacoff et. al., Appendix A-31) No wonder that Henry 
Clay did not sympathize with Sanders and “Young America”. It is also 
worthy of note that somewhat later in 1853, Sanders had been appointed 
American consul to London, where he became a close associate of 
Kossuth, who was living there at that time. (Curti, 48)  
Other leading figures of “Young America” were Stephen A. 
Douglas (1813–1861), James Shields (1806–1879), and William 
Richardson (1811–1875) of Illinois, William Corry of Ohio, William Polk 
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of Tennessee, and William R. Smith of Alabama. (Curti, 38) The outbreak 
of the European revolutions in 1848 provided the opportunity for the 
politicians of “Young America” to put their ideas into practice. This was 
also a presidential election year in the United States and under such 
circumstances the national platform of the Democratic Party incorporated 
many references to the European revolutionary movements. It referred to 
the principle of the “sovereignty of the people” and mentioned that 
European nations were “erecting republics on the ruins of despotism in 
the Old World.” (Howe-Robertson, 168–169) The presidential candidate 
of the Democratic Party became Lewis Cass, who was not the member of 
“Young America”, but who also supported territorial expansion and 
intervention. (Curti, 36) The victory over Mexico also raised the 
dangerous problem of territorial expansion and slavery in the same year. 
Henry Clay feared that under such circumstances the young zealots of 
“Young America” and its allies could seize the opportunity to push 
through national politics the program of expansion and intervention. No 
wonder that under such circumstances Henry Clay vehemently opposed 
the ideas of “Young America” and the proposal of Lewis Cass.  
Although the Senate did not approve the proposal of Cass, the 
senators obliged the President to clarify his position concerning the 
mission of Ambrose Dudley Mann. Zachary Taylor sent over the papers 
to the Senate but he attached a provocative preamble to it which triggered 
the official remonstrance of Austria on September 30, 1850. Meanwhile, 
President Taylor died on July 9, 1850 and Millard Fillmore became the 
new president. He was a close friend of Henry Clay, and he appointed a 
new secretary of state in the person of Daniel Webster, who responded to 
the complaint of Austria in a long and detailed memorial on December 
21, 1850. Much has been written about this famous piece of Webster and 
the diplomatic tension it caused between Austria and the United States. 
(Várdy, 2000, 47; Vasváry, 57-58; Lévai, 2005, 309–313) Webster’s 
celebrated response was generally well received in the United States and 
there was a proposal in the Senate to print it out in ten thousand copies. 
Henry Clay opposed this proposition in a speech he delivered in the 
Senate on December 30, 1850. He called the attention of his colleagues to 
the fact that Hungary had been defeated. He posed the question whether 
under such circumstances it would be a good policy on the part of the 
United States “to continue to irritate either Austria or Russia” on “a 
subject which was past and had ended.” (Hay, 837) President Fillmore 
sent over to the Senate the correspondence between Webster and 
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Hülsemann and the papers concerning the mission Ambrose Dudley 
Mann to Hungary. Clay supported the measures of the Whig 
administration, which are “marked by great ability as everything which 
emanates from that source generally is.” (Hay, 837) Nevertheless, he 
opposed “a diffusion of this paper (viz. Webster’s answer to Hülsemann’s 
remonstrance) among the people of the United States.” (Hay, 837) 
According to his opinion, these copies “are not wanted by the people of 
the United States” because “they are satisfied with the principles first laid 
down by the immortal Father of his Country (viz. George Washington), 
and to which there has been a general adherence from that day to this.” 
(Hay, 838) With Mann’s mission in mind he cited the United States as an 
example to his colleagues. Clay posed the question what would happen if 
one of the states of the Union “revolted against the General Government, 
and any European power sent an agent here for the purpose of obtaining 
information, even such as that which our agent had been sent to 
Hungary.” (Hay, 838) He was sure that there would certainly be “a great 
deal of feeling throughout the United States.” He also added that we 
should “place ourselves in their position” before the United States should 
take any further action concerning Hungary. (Hay, 838) This passage of 
Clay is interesting for the purpose of this essay for several reasons. It is 
clear that he did not agree full heartedly with the sending of Mann to 
Hungary. As it will be discussed in details later on, this debate about the 
“Hungarian question” was almost at the same time with the great 
discussion about slavery that led to the approval of the famous 
compromise of 1850, in the conclusion of which Henry Clay also played a 
crucial role. Under such circumstances, his allusion to the revolt of one of 
the states “against the General Government” referred to a very sensitive 
issue of the period. It is clear from this statement that the issues of 
Hungary and slavery were interconnected in the mind of Henry Clay. In 
the remaining part of his speech he approved the general course of the 
administration’s policy towards Austria, but he added that it wouldn’t be 
wise to “say anything in that document (viz. Webster’s response to 
Hülsemann’s remonstrance), which another Government must feel as 
reproach.” (Hay, 838) At the end of his address Clay stressed again that 
“there was no necessity for printing the great number of copies which had 
been proposed”, since the “principles contained in that paper were 
fastened and fixed in the American heart and mind”, and the publication 
of Webster’s response would only “continue the irritation which may 
exist between a foreign Government and this.” (Hay, 838) Mainly due to 
230 
the efforts of Henry Clay the Senate refused the proposal concerning the 
printing out of Webster’s response. 
By the time of the arrival of Lajos Kossuth to the United States, 
almost one year later on December 4, 1851, the seventy-four-year-old 
Henry Clay was mortally ill. Kossuth was mainly aided by the members 
of “Young America” and in the Senate by such politicians as Lewis Cass, 
Stephen A. Douglas, William Henry Seward (1801–1872), and James 
Shields who supported expansion and intervention. Kossuth arrived in 
Washington on December 30, 1851, and a little bit more than a week 
later, he took part at a reception organized in his honor by the Congress 
on January 7, 1851. At his reception secretary of state Daniel Webster 
answered the address of Kossuth. Although the language of Webster’s 
speech was more moderate than the intonation of his response to 
Hülsemann’s complaint: he said, for example: “In my opinion, Austria 
would be a better and a stronger government tomorrow if she confined the 
limits of her power to her hereditary and German domains, especially if 
she saw in Hungary a strong, sensible, independent neighboring nation.” 
(Mills, 6) Kossuth visited Henry Clay in his quarters after such 
antecedents only two days later on January 9. Clay was alarmed by the 
popularity and influence of Kossuth and also by the assistance of him by 
such American politicians who supported expansion and intervention, and 
who were his political opponents. Clay’s position was not an easy one 
since he wanted to express his sympathy towards Kossuth and the 
Hungarians on the one hand, but he wanted to make clear his opposition 
to the policy of intervention in Europe by the United States on the other. 
Lewis Cass, his old opponent, accompanied Kossuth to the bed chamber 
of Clay. All this mean that one can interpret the speech of Henry Clay to 
Kossuth only in the context of American domestic politics. 
Clay started his address with the expression of his admiration of 
Kossuth’s accomplishments as a politician and orator. He pointed out that 
“your wonderful and fascinating eloquence has mesmerized so large a 
portion of our people wherever you have gone, and even some of our 
members of Congress.” (Hay, 944) According to the witnesses of the 
scene, at this point of his speech, Clay was waving his hand toward the 
American politicians who accompanied Kossuth, Lewis Cass among 
them. But after this courtesy he expressed to Kossuth that “I hope, to 
speak with that sincerity and candor which becomes the interest the 
subject has for you and for myself, and which is due to us both, as the 
votaries of freedom.” (Hay, 944) Clay assured the Hungarian that “I 
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entertain the liveliest sympathies in every struggle for liberty in Hungary, 
and in every country, and in this I believe I express the universal 
sentiment of my countrymen.” (Hay, 944) But in the next sentence he said 
to Kossuth that “for the sake of my country, you must allow me to protest 
against the policy you propose to her.” Clay posed the “momentous 
question of the right of one nation to assume the executive power among 
nations for the enforcement of international law, or of the right of the 
United States to dictate to Russia the character of her relations with the 
nations around her.” (Hay, 944) According to the Kentuckian politician, 
Kossuth sought “material aid” in America, and wanted the United States 
to put into practice its declarations concerning Austria, Russia, and 
Hungary. In the opinion of Clay, the former governor of Hungary 
proposed war between the United States on the one hand, and Russia and 
Austria on the other. But he warned Kossuth:  
To transport men and arms across the ocean in sufficient numbers and 
quantities to be effective against Russia and Austria would be 
impossible… Upon land, Russia is invulnerable to us, as we are to her. 
Upon the ocean, a war between Russia and this country would result in 
mutual annoyance to commerce, but probably little else… her parts are 
few, her commerce limited, while we, on our part, would offer as a prey 
to her cruisers a rich and extensive commerce. (Hay, 944–945)  
It means that it was clearly not in the interest of the United States to 
wage war against such powerful European empires. According to Clay, it 
would be hypocrisy on the part of the American republic to support 
intervention in Europe when she is strong, and abandon it when she is 
weak. He argued that the despotic powers of Europe would refer to 
American intervention as an example, on the basis of which they would 
support their intervention on the American continent. Henry Clay 
concluded that the real role of the United States in the struggle against the 
despotic governments of Europe was to set an example to the oppressed 
nations of the Old World. By the policy of non-intervention “to which we 
have adhered since the days of Washington, we have prospered beyond 
precedent – we have done more for the cause of liberty in the world that 
arms could effect. We have showed to other nations the way to greatness 
and happiness.” (Hay, 945) As the result of a European war on behalf of 
Hungary or other European republics, the United States “could effect 
nothing, and if in that struggle Hungary should go down, and we should 
go down with her, where, then, would be the last hope of the friends of 
freedom throughout the world? Far better it is for ourselves, for Hungary, 
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and for the cause of liberty, that, adhering to our wise, pacific system, and 
avoiding the distant wars of Europe, we should keep our lamp burning 
brightly on this western shore as a light to all nations, than to hazard its 
utter extinction amid the ruins of fallen or falling republics in Europe.” 
(Hay, 945–946) 
In this speech Henry Clay unequivocally rejected the idea of 
intervention on behalf of Hungary. He could maintain the traditional 
foreign policy of the United States towards Europe by the endorsement of 
the principle of American exceptionalism.  
Henry Clay’s speech to Kossuth proved to be his last public 
address, since he died a little bit more than six months later on June 29, 
1852. But this does not mean that he never mentioned Kossuth and the 
“Hungarian question” in his writings again. He received a letter, for 
example, from Theodore Freylinghausen (1787–1862), who was a former 
senator from New Jersey and his running mate during the election 
campaign in 1844. In his letter Freylinghausen mentioned to Clay that “he 
had been rejoiced to hear his words of soberness and truth on the exciting 
question of Hungarian politics.” (Hay, 948)  
Due to his illness, Henry Clay was not able to visit the 
Congressional banquet honoring George Washington’s birthday on 
February 22, 1852. Nevertheless, his written answer to the invitation 
provided him another opportunity to express his adherence to the 
traditional foreign policy of the United States towards Europe, founded by 
the first president. Referring probably to the efforts of some American 
politicians and Kossuth, Clay mentioned:  
We have seen serious attempts to induce the United States to depart from 
his great principles of peace and neutrality, of avoiding all entangling 
alliances with foreign Powers, and of confining ourselves to the growth, 
improvement, and prosperity of our new country; and in place of them, 
to plunge ourselves… in the wars of Europe. (Hay, 955) 
Clay’s message was printed out in the Daily National Intelligencer 
a few days later, so the position of him could become clear for the public 
opinion.  
Meanwhile, Kossuth had started his tour throughout the United 
States. He was very well received and applauded in the western parts of 
Pennsylvania and in Ohio, but his reception in Kentucky was not so 
cordial. (Oliver, 487–492) The city of Louisville did not invite him 
officially, and when he delivered a speech in the city in a tobacco store on 
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Mach 4, 1852, not only his admirers but his opponents were also present, 
and the latter caused some disturbance during his address. John W. Oliver 
attributed the relatively cold reception of Kossuth to the “lukewarm 
attitude assumed by Henry Clay… his stand was well known to his 
constituents, and this tended to dampen the enthusiasm for Kossuth in the 
Blue Grass State.” (Oliver, 492–493) In contrast, Dénes Jánossy ascribed 
it to the special economic interests of the South. According to him, the 
European stability provided by the military intervention of Russia, would 
make possible the maintenance of the economic ties between the South 
and Europe. Under such circumstances Kossuth felt it necessary to 
explain his policy of intervention to the audience of Kentucky. In another 
speech delivered also in Louisville, Kossuth wanted to convince his 
audience about the correctness of his policy of intervention of the United 
States in Europe. He argued that only the small nations could have the 
luxury of detachment from the great events of world politics. But such 
great nations as the United States were twitted to the world with several 
thousand ties, so they simply could not detach themselves from world 
affairs. The neutrality of a great power in itself means intervention on the 
part of one of the interested parties. In the case of the conflict of Hungary 
on the one hand, and Austria and Russia on the other, the neutrality of the 
United States means intervention on the part of European absolutism. The 
neutrality of the United States could lead to the intervention of European 
absolutism into the affairs of the American republic. Kossuth posed the 
question why the United States conducts such a ruinous foreign policy? 
On the basis of his speech to him, Kossuth attributed it mainly to the 
harmful influence of Senator Henry Clay. (Jánossy, 328–332) 
In this address Kossuth clearly initiated an attack against Henry 
Clay, and the news of it reached not only Clay himself but Johann Georg 
Hülsemann, too. In a letter which he sent to an unknown recipient on 
March 30, 1852, Clay expounded: “I have never distinctly understood 
what Mr. Kossuth said of me at Louisville. I certainly had given him no 
cause of offence.” (Hay, 962) He pointed out that his speech to Kossuth 
was not a private affair, since several other persons were present. As a 
result “What I had said… was variously and sometimes contradictorily 
represented in the newspapers.”(Hay, 962) Senator Thomas Ewing 
(1789–1871) was also present and, according to Clay, he verified the 
accuracy of the statement that was published. He even added a preface to 
it in which he treated Kossuth “with perfect respect.” Clay assured his 
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unknown correspondent that “Over my own sentiments and language I 
thought I had entire control.” (Hay, 962) 
In his report to Prince Schwarzenberg on March 16, 1852, 
Hülsemann also mentioned Kossuth’s attack against Clay with great 
complacency. According to him, by attacking the mortally ill Henry Clay 
in his own state, Kossuth made a serious mistake, what was good news 
from the Austrian point of view. (Jánossy, 654)  
The example of Kossuth and Clay was also invoked in the Senate in 
these days. Senator William Henry Seward, a member of “Young 
America”, evoked the example of Henry Clay on March 9, 1852, when he 
supported the recognition of the young republics of Latin America at the 
beginning of the 1820s. Seward asked the question, how Clay could 
oppose intervention on behalf of Hungary when he supported intervention 
into the affairs of the Spanish Empire thirty years before? (Jánossy, 333)  
Meanwhile, Kossuth continued his tour to New Orleans. He arrived 
in the city on March 27, and his reception was even colder than in 
Louisville. (Oliver, 495; Jánossy, 341–343) Dénes Jánossy attributed it to 
the general Southern condemnation of Kossuth, and also to the fact that 
the former governor of Hungary was invited by a Democratic city 
government, while, by the time of his arrival, the city had been governed 
by the Whig Party. Kossuth still believed that the unfavorable opinion of 
Henry Clay also played a crucial part in it. The local Whig press heavily 
criticized Kossuth’s Louisville address in which he attacked Henry Clay, 
one of the most prestigious leaders of the party. Under such 
circumstances, Kossuth felt it necessary to clarify his standpoint about the 
Whig politician. He also wanted to win the sympathy of the South. 
According to the reports of the American press, Kossuth tacitly noticed 
the reasoning of Clay concerning foreign policy. On the basis of these 
reports, many came to the conclusion that Kossuth adopted the ideas of 
the Kentuckian. In the speech he delivered in New Orleans, he wanted to 
give an explanation of his personal meeting with Clay. According to 
Kossuth, he did not want to tackle with Henry Clay, because of the 
serious illness of the latter. He deemed his visit of Clay a private affair, 
and he did not think that the address of Clay would be publicized. Not to 
mention the fact that the press misinterpreted his abstention towards the 
mortally ill senator. Then, in the second part of his address, he drew a 
parallel between the position of Hungary and the South. According to 
him, Hungary was fighting for her constitutional self-government, which 
is also very important for the South. It is clear, that Kossuth realized the 
235 
importance of this argument for the South, in the midst of the embittered 
debate about the territorial expansion of slavery. The intonation of this 
speech was much milder than that of his Louisville address. Kossuth 
argued that he did not want the Union to wage war for Hungary, but he 
simply asked for the sympathy of the American people. (Jánossy, 342–
343) 
Hülsemann, again, proved to be very well informed about the cold 
reception of Kossuth in New Orleans. In a report to Prince 
Schwarzenberg on April 8, 1852, he mentioned that Kossuth was not well 
received in the city despite the fact that he strove to explain his ill 
behavior towards Henry Clay.  
On the basis of all this it is clear that Henry Clay’s opinion about 
the “Hungarian question” and Lajos Kossuth was partly determined by 
the developments of American domestic politics, but it was also formed 
by his opinion about the territorial extension of slavery as well as by his 
attitude towards African-Americans and the peculiar institution of the 
South.  
Henry Clay and the problem of slavery 
As a result of the victory against Mexico the United States gained 
an enormously large section, including the territories of present day 
California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. This 
territorial gain raised again the issue of the extension of slavery, and the 
outbreak of the gold rush in California in January 1848 made it even more 
serious. Due to the gold rush the population of California exceeded 
100,000 by the end of 1849, much more than it was needed to gain 
statehood. President Taylor did not realize the significance of the problem 
and urged California and New Mexico to frame constitutions and apply 
for statehood. Ignoring the heated debate about the right of Congress to 
restrain the extension of slavery on territories under the authority of the 
federal government, Taylor practically empowered these states to decide 
for their own about the question. The California convention ratified an 
anti-slavery constitution in March 1850 and New Mexico followed the 
example a few months later. The Southern slave-holding states had been 
alarmed by these developments for several reasons. Approximately half 
of the territory of California and the whole territory of New Mexico 
located to the south of the line established in the Missouri Compromise, 
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according to which slave holding states should have been formed south of 
the line 36°30’. As already mentioned, there was a northern majority in 
the United States House of Representatives from the 1810s, and the 
number of free and slave states was equal in the Senate in 1849. There 
were fifteen slaveholding and fifteen free members of the Union then. 
Under such conditions Southern interests had been alarmed, “since none 
of the remaining territories was likely to become a slave state, a Northern 
majority, once achieved, would be permanent and might ultimately be 
large enough to permit a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.” 
(Jones, 192) Besides this major question there were minor issues at stake 
as well. Northerners also wanted to secure the abolition of slavery in the 
District of Columbia, while Southerners sought to introduce a more 
efficient fugitive-slave act. Furthermore, Texas was claiming a portion of 
New Mexico.  
Under such circumstances did the thirty-first Congress convene in 
December 1849, and the seventy-two year-old Henry Clay was among the 
members of the Senate again. “The Great Compromiser” decided to return 
into the Senate in this state of emergency. He hammered out a 
compromise to cover all the disputed issues in one proposal. He 
introduced into the Senate on January 29, 1850, almost at the same time 
with his speech against Cass’ proposal concerning the suspension of 
diplomatic relations with Austria, a set of resolutions which proposed that 
(1) California be admitted as a free state; (2) other territories acquired 
from Mexico be organized with no mention of the status of slavery; (3) 
that Texas abandon its claim to New Mexico; (4) the federal government 
assume that Texan national debt contracted before annexation; (5) slave-
trade in the District of Columbia be abolished; (6) slavery in the District 
of Columbia only be abolished if the people of the District and of 
Maryland consented and if compensation were paid; (7) a new and more 
effective Fugitive Slave Act be passed; and (8) Congress declare that it 
had no power to interfere with the interstate slave-trade. (Jones, 192-193)  
Clay’s proposal provoked an embittered debate in the Senate. The 
other “grand old man” of contemporary American politics, Daniel 
Webster fundamentally supported the proposal of Clay, while the most 
prestigious Southern congressional leader John C. Calhoun in the last 
speech of his life “insisted that the South possessed a constitutional right 
to take slaves into the territories and demanded a constitutional 
amendment that would restore the political balance between the sections.” 
(Jones, 193) William H. Seward from New York, a member of “Young 
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America”, also opposed Clay’s proposal—but from the Northern point of 
view. President Taylor insisted on his own statehood plan and heavily 
opposed the compromise. Henry Clay also made a mistake. He combined 
his proposals into a uniform omnibus bill “in which form it attracted the 
opposition of all who objected to parts of it” (Jones, 193). The 
disillusioned and very ill Clay decided to leave Washington at the end of 
June, 1850, and it seemed many that there is no hope for Clay’s 
compromise to succeed. But President Taylor suddenly died on July 9, 
1850 and he was succeeded by Vice-President Millard Fillmore who was 
a moderate Whig from New York and a close friend of Henry Clay. 
Fillmore used his influence in the Whig Party and in Congress to support 
Clay’s compromise. Support also came from Senator Stephen A Douglas 
of Illinois who proposed to split up Clay’s “omnibus bill into six separate 
measures and piloted them through Congress one by one” (Jones, 194). 
As a result of these efforts Congress passed the major elements of Clay’s 
proposal between September 9 and 20, 1850. Congress accepted the 
admission of California as a state and decided to organize the rest of the 
section acquired from Mexico into two territories. In the case of New 
Mexico and Utah Congress applied the “sovereignty doctrine” of Stephen 
A. Douglas and empowered the inhabitants of the two territories to decide 
whether they would adopt a constitution accepting slavery or not. As the 
part of the compromise Congress also enacted a new Fugitive Slave Act 
which “permitted slave-owners to arrest suspected runaways without a 
warrant, denied alleged fugitives the right of trial by jury and the right to 
give evidence on their own behalf, and imposed heavy penalties for 
helping slaves to escape.” (Jones, 194)  
The opinion of Henry Clay about slavery 
The problem of slavery was behind all the issues covered in the 
Compromise of 1850. In order to understand the commitment of Henry 
Clay on the part of the compromise we need to survey briefly his opinion 
about slavery and African-Americans, and Clay’s attitude towards 
Kossuth was also determined to a great extent by the problem of the 
territorial extension of slavery.  
Henry Clay was himself a slave-owner. Nevertheless, he wanted to 
find a middle ground concerning the question of slavery. He did not agree 
with the radical ideas of such abolitionists as William Lloyd Garrison, but 
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he called slavery the “deepest stain upon the character of the country” 
(Vida, 596). He thought that gradual emancipation and colonization could 
provide a middle course solution to the problem. Clay made his first effort 
to put his ideas into practice in 1799 when he introduced a plan of gradual 
emancipation through the constitutional convention of Kentucky. 
According to this, “beginning in 1855 or 1860, children born to slaves 
would become free at the age of 25.” (Vida, 596) Similarly to Thomas 
Jefferson he thought that after gradual emancipation there is no hope for 
the peaceful cohabitation of the white and black races within the 
boundaries of the United States, due to the very different physical and 
moral constitutions of the two races. (Vida, 596) Consequently, he 
proposed that emancipated blacks should leave the American republic and 
he advocated the transportation of free blacks to Liberia in Africa. 
According to him colonization would be advantageous for several 
reasons. On the one hand Americans would find a peaceful solution to the 
growing problem of slavery, and American freed blacks would be the 
pioneers of Christianity and civilization in Africa on the other. Henry 
Clay was one of the founding members of “The Society for the 
Colonization of Free People of Color of America” (American 
Colonization Society) in 1816. As one of the most prestigious politician 
in the nation Clay’s ideas about slavery had a great impact on the thought 
of the younger generation. The views of Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) 
concerning slavery were heavily influenced by the ideas of Clay. As 
István K. Vida pointed out “It is not by chance that Lincoln was asked to 
deliver the eulogy of Clay. He hailed Clay for occupying a position 
between the extremes, quoted his pro-colonization speeches and 
embraced his idea of gradual emancipation followed by colonization.” 
(Vida, 597) 
Conclusion 
Henry Clay was called the “Great Compromiser”, since it was the 
fundamental element of his political credo to find a peaceful solution to 
the problem of slavery, which had occupied a central ground in American 
politics by the beginning of the 1850s. He opposed the further expansion 
beneath the borders of the United States since it would raise again the 
question of the territorial expansion of slavery, which could ultimately 
lead to the dissolution of the union. Kossuth propagated the intervention 
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of the United States into European affairs, and he was assisted by those 
segments of American politics, which also supported the further territorial 
expansion of the American republic. As a result of the victory of the 
United States again Mexico in the war of 1846–1848, and the outbreak of 
the European revolutions of 1848–1849, there was a strong affection 
among some American politicians towards further expansion, especially 
among the members of “Young America”. As it was argued earlier, 
American domestic politics and his attitude towards the expansionist 
forces of it clearly influenced Clay’s opinion about the “Hungarian 
question” and Kossuth. Under such circumstances, in the midst of the 
embittered debates about the territorial expansion of slavery and his 
proposal concerning compromise, Clay saw in Kossuth and in his 
ambitions a force that could endanger his efforts to save the union. In 
such a way, his ideas concerning slavery and colonization also heavily 
influenced his opinion about Kossuth. There were two interconnected 
sources of Henry Clay’s opposition to the foreign policy proposed by the 
former governor of Hungary: his interpretation of the European and 
Hungarian revolutions of 1848-1849 in the mirror of American domestic 
politics and his opinion about the possible consequences of the territorial 
expansion of slavery.  
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